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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
No. 16237

EMPIRE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
EMPIRE CREDIT, INC.,
Defendant,
ED T. OLSEN and MARLENE SINE,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Suit

by holder

of promissory note against corporate

maker and its officers and stockholders on alter ego theory,
and as trustees of the assets of that dissolved corporation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Snow granted judgment for repeated failure of the
defendants to answer interrogatories, produce documents and
to obey orders compelling discovery (R. 174 - Appendix "A").
Defendants were also in default for failure to answer plaintiff's

complaint

(R.

276)

again.

Defendants

thereafter

failed to comply with the discovery ordered by Judge Snow as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a

condition

failed

to

precedent

to

vacating

truthfully answer

of

the

well after the

Judge

Judge

Appendix "I")

expired.

defendants'

and

interrogatories when they fi-

nally partially responded,
Snow had

judgment,

60 (b) ,

Taylor
URCP

time allowed by

denied

(R.

397

(R.
-

418 - i

Appendix

"H"), motion to vacate Judge Snow's judgement and his order
vacating that judgment if defendants complied with discovery
(which defendants failed to do).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
An order affirming the denial by Judge Taylor of defendants' 60(b), URCP,

to vacate Judge Snow's judgment and his

later order conditionally vacating that judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a suit by the holder of a promissory note (R.
2).

Plaintiff agrees with many of the statement of facts in

defendants'

brief, however, since much of that stateMent is

argumentative and/or is incomplete or inaccurate counsel for
plaintiff submits a separate statement of facts.
Comments Concerning Defendants' Brief

does

For

example,

not

disclose

1975,

on page

counsel

5

that notice
to

counsel

of

hearing

given

notice

is

clearly

103).

Counsel fails to observe on page 5 that the order of

in

defendant,

of June 5'

was

included

for

the

states that the file

however

that

the motion itself (R. 10 2•

August 17, 1976, signed by Judge Snow (R. 166) was obtained
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on an ex-party basis by Mr. Edmonds.

The Order was signed

by Judge Snow (after a delay of almost 11 r:ionths) immediately before hearing of plaintiff's motion to strike the
minute entry upon which that order was based was to be heard
before Judge Hanson (R. 155, 165), or that the answers were
still

not

answered

within

the

additional

15

day period

allowed by that order.
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts
Plaintiff's statement of facts is arranged according to
major events as follows:
(a)
In

Circumstances
November,

Plaintiff
missions

1972,

submitted
and

Plaintiff's

for

leading
(R.

44)

to

and May,

interrogatories
productio'(l

of

Judge Snow's Judgment:

and

1975,

(R.

90)

requests

for

ad-

documents

(R.44

&

90).

six motions to compel discovery and for sane-

tions

(R. 49,

almost

four

60, 102, 139, 155 and 167) over a period of

years resulted

in two orders compelling dis-

covery under penalty of entry of judgment (R. 56, 58, 61, &
89)

partial answers

thereafter
(R.

116,

in four

to

the first discovery (R.

62,

and

additional orders compelling discovery

141, 147, 166, 174, all of which was ignored by

defendants; three of which were judgments against defendants
ordered by Judge Harding (R. 116), Judge Croft (R. 141, 147)
and after almost 4 years in the final judgment by Judge Snow
(R. 174, 179).
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(b)

Defendants were in default for failure to answer:

Defendants motion to dismiss
sur:Jmons and complaint

(R.

58).

filed in response to the

(R. 32) was denied in January, 1975,

No answer to other pleadings had been filed by

defendants in response to plaintiff's complaint at the time
that Judge Snow entered jud_gl!lent against defendants.

The

defendants were approximately 1 2 /3 years in default at the
time judgment was entered against them (R. 179).
(c)
It

Judgement sought to be set aside:
is

Judge

Snow's

Judgment

defendants seek to vacate.
(R.

of

October,

1976,

that

Notwithstanding repeated orders

151, 166) defendants had made no attempt to respond to

the discovery submitted

in May,

Snow granted the final judgment.

1975,

(R.

90) when Judge

No counter-affidavits were

filed by defendants in opposition to

the final motion for

judgment and no objections to the discovery were submitted
prior to hearing of that motion (R. 177, •26).
(d)

Judge Snow's Findings of Fact re defendants' con-

duct:
Judge Snow made detailed

findings

of fact concerning

the refusal of defendants to participate in discovery and to
obey court orders conpelling discovery (R. 176- 178, 1[9 thru

28)

and

granted

judgment

thereof (R. 178-179).

against

defendants

by

reason

A copy of those Findings of Fact and

-4-
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Conclusions

of

Law

(R.

174 - 179)

are

attached hereto

as

Appendix "A".
It is recommended that the Court read said findings

,9

thru 28 (R. 174 - Appendix "A").
(e)

Defendants first object to interrogatories after

hearing of motion to enter judgment:
After hearing of plaintiff's last motion for judgment
before Judge Snow (R. 170) Mr. Edmonds, defendants' counsel
then,

filed

objections

to

plaintiff's

(which had been submitted over
(f)

Allegations

re

second

discovery

1/3 years before) (R. 171).

illness

of

Mr.

Edmonds

and

Mr. Olsen not made until judgment had been entered:
After entry of the judgment Mr. Edmonds filed a motion
to

vacate

alleging

the

judgment

(R.

187)

supported by affidavits

that he had been ill for about 40 days (R. 183,

216) referring to other separate lawsuits, and alleging that

Olsen had been ill

(R.

183,

203 and 216).

A motion to

strike those affidavits as insufficient was filed by plaintiff (R. 191) and a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of
plaintiff

(R.

195).

Contrary to

the

representation by

counsel for defendants (R. 187, ,2) Olsen was not suffering
from a stroke, but according to his physician had suffered a
prolonged severe illness "with a possible transient (short
lived)

ischemic

affidavit (R.

(local

203)

anemia)

attack."

The physician's

indicates that Mr. Olsen may have been
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unable
time,

to

prepare

for

or

participate

in

a

trial

at

that

but says nothing about his ability to supply infor-

mation required to respond to interrogatories.
(g)

Plaintiff's affidavit disputes alleged illness of'

Olsen:
The affidavit filed by plaintiff to opposition. to the
to vacate the judgment shows

that during

the period while

Olsen was allegedly ill that he remarried, went on a honeymoon,
ness

regularly drove his automobile to transact his busiand

affairs,

and

appeared

to

the

person making the

affidavit to be fully competent and capable of handling his
affairs and of responding to discovery (R. 196, •12).
of

those

items

were

alleged

in oposition

NoM

the motion for

judgment in the hearing before Judge Snow where the judgment
was granted.
Judge Snow,

and probably the later judges, considered

the conflicting affidavits re alleged illness in exercising
their discretion concerning motions

to vacate Judge Snow's

judgment.
(h)

New counsel for defendants

appears before heari11&

of motion to vacate judgment:
Prior
Bottum and

to

hearing

Clyde C.

of

that motion

Patterson entered

attorneys

their appearance as

counsel for defendants (R. 215).
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Joseph H.

(i)

New counsel successfully argues that prior counsel

for defendants was grossly negligent:
Mr.

Bottum filed a memorandum (R. 269-270) in support

of defendants' motion to vacate Judge Snow's judgment wherein he

successfully argued

"obbvious

neglect

and

that Mr.

inattention

Edmonds was guilty of
to

the matter",

cited

cases in support of the proposition that "neglect of counsel

in

aggravated

circumstances",

"personal

problems

of

counsel which caused him to grossly neglect the case of a
diligent

client and

to mislead

the client" was an "other

reason" under Rule 60 (b), URCP, for vacating a judgment (R.
269-270;
dants

412-413).

were

The record does not show that defen-

"diligent"

Judge Snow that Mr.
the

defendants

in

in this case.

Mr.

Bottum advised

Edmonds would not thereafter represent

this matter

(R.

341,

~2),

however, Mr.

Edmonds continued to represent the defendants for another 1

3/4 years (R. 393).
(j)

Judge Snow's

order does not vacate

the judgment

unless conditions stated therein appear of record within 30
days:

"l.

• • • shall be vacated and set aside at
such time as it appears on the record
that defendants have • .
paid • · •
attorney fees, • . • have fully answered
interrogatories and requests for admissions • . have produced the docur;ients
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• and have fully complied with the
terms of prior orders entered in this
matter
requiring
the
defendants
to
answer interrogatories and/or requests
for
admissions and
to produce documents". (emphasis added)
That order also provides (R.273, ,2):
"In the event that defendants fail to fully
comply with the conditions imposed
under the terms of paragraph 111 above
within 30 days,
after
entry of this
order,
then defendants'
motion to vacate and set aside the jud8ment entered
herein
•
•
.
is denie • "
(Emphasis
added)
(k)

Judge Snow

later reaffirmed

by counsel for plaintiff (quoted above -

the

order prepared

R.

272 - Appendix

"C" attached):
Mr.

Bottum

also

prepared

and

submitted

Judge Snow which was also signed (R.

an order to

274-275), however Mr.

Bottum indicated by letter (R. 271) that he had no objection
to the terms of the order prepared by counsel for plaintiff
since "compliance with discovery is understood", difference
between the orders being that his order omitted the requirements

concerning

compliance

with

struck the order submitted by Mr.

discovery,

Judge

Snow

Bottum and reaffirmed the

order submitted by counsel for plaintiff which contained the
language compelling compliance with discovery within 30 days
recited above (R. 337-338).
( 1)

Defendants'

answer

contains

no defense

general denial:
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exc~

Defendants finally filed an answer by a general denial
in January 1977, (R. 276) and later amended that answer (R.
331 ) , again as a general denial.

Attached to plaintiff's

complaint is a copy of the promissory note upon which the
lawsuit is based (Following R. 17).

Defendants have delayed

enforcement of this lawsuit for almost seven years (R. 2),
(m)

Defendants' third-party complaint against the bank

was dismissed in 1975:
Valley Bank & Trust Company had been named as a thirdparty defendant by defendants (R. 33-34) obtained an order
of disr:Jissal in October, 1975, by reason of non-appearance
of

Mr. Edmonds (R. 154), filed motions and affidavits in an

effort to have that judgment of dismissal vacated (R. 280291),

however

that

motion

was

denied

by reason of Mr.

Edmond's failure to appear for the hearing February, 1977,
(R. 334).
(n)

Defendants

posed by Judge
the judgment

failed to

comply with

conditions im-

Snow and thereby forfeited the right to have

vacated

under

Judge Snow's

order

(R. 272 -

Appendix "C") defendants were required to comply

with said

discovery by January 29, 1977.
During January, 1977, defendants filed partial answers
to

the

discovery

submitted

in May,

1975,

(R.

301),

and

partially supplemented their answers to discovery submitted
in November, 1972, (R. 292), however defendants filed objections

to

and

did

not

answer

certain interrogatories (as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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_q_

Judge Snow had ordered - R.

272- Appendix "C" annexed) and

failed to produce certain documents required to be produced
under the terms of that order.
Under date of July 20,

1977, defendants filed a notice

that they would make tax returns available on July 27, 1979,
but failed

to do so within the

time required by the order

(R. 384, ,8, R. 309), and supplied a false sworn answer too
said interrogatory #10,
property in which

purporting to list all of the real

the defendant

during the discovery period.
(o)

Judge

plaintiff

had

a

financial

interest

See sub-paragraph (s) below.

Snow's judgment having not

been

set aside

moved for an order vacating a stay order (entered

by Judge Snow pending hearing on defendants' motion):
Plaintiff then filed a motion (See also pages 10-11 of
defendants
staying

brief)

execution

to

vacate

(R.

180,

345)

(R.

340)

Judge

which

Snow's

had

been

order

entered

pending hearing of the motion to vacate the judgment, alleging that since the defendants had failed to comply with
the conditions imposed by Judge Snow in his order within the
time required by that order (R. 273-273 - Appendix "C") that
the defendants'
denied

as

notion

provided

in

to

vacate

Judge

the

Snow's

judgnent was
order,

that

deemed

judgment

having not been vacated.
(p)

Judge Conder's order - July 18, 1977:

Judge Conder conditionally denied that motion, (R. 355,

356, 361, 366, 371, & 372) ordered the defendants to furnish
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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documents and to answer interrogatory 1110 of the May, 1975,
interrogatories

(R.

309,

HO), by an order signed July 18,

1977, (R. 356).
Plaintiff's

counsel

believed

that no order had been

signed concerning the June 22, 1977, hearing and submitted
another

proposed

order

November

3,

1977,

362).

On December 8, 1977, plaintiff's counsel sent another
that

order

to

Judge

Conder

proposed

order

appeared

to not be in the file.

memo

counsel

1977,

371)

was

of

by Judge Conder November 27,

(R.

which

copy

si.gn.ed

about

indicating

submitted about November 3, 1977,

had

suggested

that
(R.

(R.

the
371)

In the November 3, 1977,

that

Judge

Conder

withhold

signing that order for a few days to see if other counsel
objected

to

the

December

8,

1977,

that order.
both Mr.

terms

of th.e

letter

proposed order,

suggested

and in the

that no objections to

Copies of that letter and order were sent to

Edmonds

and Mr.

Bottum

(R.

They made no

371).

objection to that order.
(q)
change

Judge

legal effect

hearing:

of prior

orders

order

concerning

did

not

the same

(R. 372 - Appendix "E").

Judge
signed

Conder's December 8, 1977,

Conder

apparently

was

not

aware

that

he

had

the two prior orders concerning the June 22, 1977 •

hearing and signed the third order Decenber 8, 1977 • but in
doing so deleted the words "fully completely, truthfully and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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accurately".

A substanial part of defendants'

argument is

devoted to the change in said order (see defendants' brief
pages 10-12).
motion

to

Again in that order Judge Conder granted the

strike

the

stay order

if defendants

failed

fully comply with the terms of the order (R. 373,,13).
orders

are

Deletion

set

of

forth on pages

those

words

had

8-9

no

of defendants'

legal

effect

to

Said
brief.

upon Judge

Conder' s order or the existing order of Judge Snow (R. 272,
- Appendix "C"),

as discussed more fully under the "argu-

ment" section of this brief.
(r)
answer

Further discovery

proved that

defendants' answer

to interrogatory #10 was false (R. 309, see also

~

(n) above):
Requests
375),

for

admissions

which were not

denied

submitted

by

plaintiff

(R.

by defendants and are deemed

admitted, (Rule 36(a), URCP) established that defendants had
omitted eight (8)
interrogatory

#10

parcel of property from

(R.

Defendants

375).

their answer to
also

failed

to

answer the interrogatores submitted with those request for
admissions
blished

(R.

that

interrogatory

375).

Those adnissions conclusively esta-

the defendants has
#10

(R.

309)

falsified

(See

also

their answer to

sub-paragraph

(n)

above).
(s)

Plaintiff filed a new motion to direct executiQ.E!:

On August 15,

1978,

plaintiffs

filed a new motion to
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direct the Clerk to issue execution, summarizing proceedings
to that point (R. 382), and arguing the legal effect of the
various orders.
"E"

-

R.

A copy of that motion is found in Appendix

382-386.

Counsel

for plaintiff was not aware of

the deletion of the words "fully, completely, truthfully and
accurately" by Judge Conder from one of the three orders (R.
272 - Appendix "C")

signed by him. concerning the June 22,

1977, hearing and accordingly did not so state in his motion
(R. 382-385, 'J8).

(t)

Hearing of motion before Judge Taylor:

That motion came on for hearing before Judge Taylor who
granted Mr.
week

"to

Edmonds request

give

defendants
392).

counsel" (R.

to continue the case for one
an

opportunity

to

employ new

Mr. Edmonds appeared at the continued

hearing without new counsel and was pernitted to withdraw at
that hearing (R.

393 ) •

At that hearing Mr. Edmonds indi-

cated that his services had been terminated by the defendants (R. 393).

Judge Taylor granted plaintiff's motion for

execution and Mr. Edmonds motion to withdraw (R. 391), found
that

the

conditons

imposed by Judges Snow and Conder in

their orders had not been met by the defendants, that the
judgment

had

not

been vacated by prior orders,

and that

under the terms of both of those orders defendants motion to
vacate the judgment had been denied.

Judge Taylor vacated

the order of Judge Snow staying execution, and reaffirmed
Judge Snow's judgment. (R. 393-394).
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Mr. Sessions appears for defendants

(u)

and moves to

vacate execution and judgment:
Mr.
dants

Clark W.

(R.

395)

Sessions appeared as counsel

and moved

under

Rule

69(b),

for defen-

URCP,

to

set

aside and vacate the order of September 13, 1978, (R. 392 order continuing motion from September 5, 1978, to September
12,

1978),

the

the judgment of October 19,

execution

asserting

as

grounds

1976,
that

(R. 179) and
plaintiff

had

proceeded with execution after Edmonds had withdrawn without
serving a notice to appoint a new attorney (R. 397-399, 404406).

That motion does

not

ceeding to enter the order

object

(R.

393)

to

Judge Taylor pro-

directing issuance of

execution at the hearing where Mr. Edoonds withdrew (R. 397,
404).
(v)

Judge Taylor granted motion in companion case and

vacated

$110,000.00

judgment

against

defendant

Olsen in

that hearing:
At the time that Judge Taylor heard that moiotn filed
by Mr.

Sessions,

#207423
defendant

and

he

vacated

Olsen

(the

also
a

heard

a

similar motion

$110,000.00

same Olsen

as

judgment
is

in case

against

defendant

in

the
this

case), which judgment had been entered as a result of similar refusal by Olsen and the other defendants to respond to
discovery and

to

obey orders

compelling

discovery.

That

matter was before this Court on a petition for intermediate
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appeal as case No. 16237, which petition was denied.
Taylor

exercised

his

Judge

di· screti· on b Y d enying
·
one motion to

vacate a judgment and granting the other.
(x)

New counsel raises question

Conder of said five words

of deletion by

Judge

from his order for the first time

on appeal:
Mr.

Sessions

then withdrew

(R.

415)

and Mr. Roe now

appears as counsel for defendants (R. 416).
No

argument

was

presented

to

Judge

Taylor

by

Mr.

Sessions concerning the deletion by Judge Conder of the five
words

from his order (R. 372-373 - Appendix "D").

appeared

Mr. Roe

in this matter in the stead of Mr. Sessions after

that motion was heard by Judge Taylor (R. 416) who now seeks
to

raise

this

the

appeal

issue

for

the first

(Defendants'

time in connection with

brief pages 8-12,

21-22,

& 25) •

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT

PROPERLY

EXERCISED ITS

DISCRETION IN RE-

FUSING TO VACATE TWO YEAR OLD JUDGMENT AND LATER ORDER CONVACATING THAT JUDGMENT
Entry of the judgment against defendants for continued
and

repeated

participate

disobedience of Court orders and refusal
in discovery,

the requirement

that

to

the imposition by Judge Snow of

the defendants comply with discovery,

court orders compelling discovery as a condition precedent
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to

vacating

of

the

judgment,

the

orders

of Judge

Conder

imposing conditions and of Judge Taylor denying relief were
all proper exercise of discretionary functions by the Co.urt
which were

adequtely

supported

by defendants'

record

and

should be affirmed by this Court for the following reasons:
1.

Plaintiff's two sets of interrogatories were proper

and plaintiff was lenient in extending time to permit defendants to comply
Counsel for defendants attempts to confuse the issues
by criticizing plaintiff's efforts to compel defendants to
comply

with

discovery

"procedure run amuck"
was

used

for

by
(P.

referring

to

those

efforts

as

12) and asserting that discovery

"harassment".

Counsel

for

defendants

also

criticizes efforts by the Court and counsel for plaintiff
for being indulgent toward defendants by repeatedly giving
defendants additional chances to remedy their defaults and
to respond to discovery as a part of orders imposing sanctions by referring to those orders as "iffy judgments and
others" (P. 12).
2.

Defendants failed to show

that they

have

a meri-

torious defense to plaintiff's claim.
Counsel for defendants asserts (without support in the
record) that the defendants had a "meritorious defense" (P.
12-25).

The lawsuit is a simply action by the holder of a

promissory note (R. 174 - Appendix "A").

No affirmative
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defense was asserted by the defendants who filed a general
denial

(R.

similar

to

276,

311 -

Appendix "D").

This situation is

the case of Utah State Employee Credit Union v.

Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 24 U.2d

211, where this Court held that

where the defendant offered no proof other then denial in
answer

as

grounds for vacating a summary judgment entered

for plain tiff in a suit on a note, the motion to vacate the
judgment was correctly denied.
3.

Defendant

cannot assert matters on

appeal

which

their

appeal

claims which were not asserted in the lower Court.

Defen-

were not asserted in the lower
Defendants

cannot

Court:

properly

assert

in

dants' assertion in their brief that they have a meritorious
defense to plaintiff's claim is asserted for the first time
on appeal

(defendants' brief P. 12,25), but was not assert-

ed in the lower Court

276, 311 - Appendix "D").

(R.

also discussion under paragraph #2 above.
tion in their brief (P.
aware

of

the

25)

"character

of

See

Defendants asser-

that the Judge Taylor was not
the

order

entered

by Judge

Conder" was not raised or argued in the lower court and also
cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal. Reliable
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc.
380 P.2d 135,

14 U.2d 169;

Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley,

396 P.2d 410, 16 U.2d 97.

-17-
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4.

Defendants

were

adequately

represented by

well

qualified counsel at the time of hearing of the motion which
resulted in the order from which the appeal is taken.
At the time of the hearing before Judge Taylor which
resulted in the order from which the appeal is taken (R. 418
- Appendix "I") defendants were represented by Mr. Sessions.
No

claim is made by defendants that Mr.

competent.

All

of

the

information

with

Sessions was not
respect

to

the

modified wording of Judge Condor's order was readily available in the court record prior to that hearing for examination by the Court and by Mr.
claim

of

supported

Sessions.

"misrepresentations
by the

record

to

(which

the
it

Even if defendants'
court"

is not),

(P.

24) were

the purported

misconduct would be "intrinsic" (within the framework of the
lawsuit)

and

accordingly

would

not

entitle defendants to

relief.

The failure of a party to have used due diligence

in presenting all of the facts to the Court or in failing to
meet incorrect assertions (or even prejured testimony) will
not be redressed in a direct attack on the judgMent.
v. W. E. Callahan Const. Co.

156

P.2d

710,

108

Wright
U.

28;

Auerbach v. Samuels, 349 P.2d 1112, 10 U.2d 152.
S.

The judgment and orders were clear and unambiguo~:

Counsel for defendants further attempts to confuse the
issues by suggesting that it is uncertain from the record

-18-
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whether the judgment was Judge Snow's original judgment in
1976,

(R.

179

-

Appendix

"B")

or Judge Taylor's order

ratifying and reaffirming that judgment (R. 394 - Appendix
11 F 11 ).

.
is
apparent f rom Judge Snow's judgment that it is

It

unconditional

179 - Appendix 11 A11 ).

(R.

Judge Snow's order

of December 30, 1976, does not purport to vacate the judgment but instead states that the judgment (R. 272 - Appendix
"C11):
11

• • shall be vacated and set aside at such
time as it appears on the record that the
defendants have • • • 11

The conditions imposed by that order were not met and the
judgment was never
simply denied
said

set aside.

defendants'

judgment and

order

The order of Judge Taylor

motions to vacate and set aside
of Judge Snow (R. 418 - Appendix

"I").

6.
orders

Defendants'

motion

to

vacate

the judgment

were filed well after the time permitted

and

under Rule

69(b), URCP:
Rule 60(b), URCP, reads in part as follows:
11 • • • The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2),
(3),
or
(4),
not more than three months
after the "ud ment order or roceedin
was entere or ta en.
Emp asis
added)

Defendants'
pendix

motion was filed December, 1978, (R. 397 - Ap-

11H11),

October,

1976,

and
(R.

sought
179,

to vacate a judgment entered
Appendix

11 11
B )

over

two

years
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in

before, and to vacate an order entered September 13, 1978.
(R. 393 - Appendix "G") which construed orders of Judge Sno1;
dated December, 1976, (R.

272 - Appendix "C"), and of Judge

Conder dated July 1977,

(R.

361) and December, 1977,

(R.

beyond

the

time permitted

356),

November 30,

1977, (R.

372 - Appendix "E"), all well

under

Rule

60 (b) ,

URCP

(quoted

above).
Defendants'

appeal

is not

from Judge Snow's judgment,

or from his order which stated conditions under which that
judgment

could

be

vacated,

Taylor of defendants'
and order.
dants;

attorney

1976,

is

from

denial

by Judge

second motion to vacate that judgment

A similar 60(b),

prior

December,

but

order

(R.
(R.

URCP,
187)

-

272

motion filed by de fen·

resulted

in Judge Snow's

Appendix "C") • Denial of

relief was also justified by the fact that orders of Judge
Snow,

Judge Conder and Judge Taylor

resulting

for 60(b),

URCP motions had not been appealed and were res judicata.
7.

Sub-divison (7)

of

Rule 60(b),

used to avoid the three month

limit

TJRCP,

on motions

cannot be
based

on

mistake or inadvertance:
A client has a duty to contact his attorney and to ke~
himself advised as to his pending litigation.

If defendants

were not advised as to the status of their case it was t~U
own mistake.

Arikem Intermountain, Inc., v. Parker, 30 U. 2d

-20-
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65,

513 P.2d 429.

In Pitts v. McLanchlan, 567 P. 2d 171

(Utahl977). the Supreme Court denied relief after the three
month

period

provided

by

Rule 60 (b),

URCP had

expired,

stating that reference to sub-section (7) of that rule could
not be used

to avoid

the three month limit upon motions

based on mistake or inadvertance.

In that decision at page

173 the Court stated:
"We think the Chancellery may not be
the appro priate place to seek redress
for one's admitted 'mistake' or 'inadvertance, '".
II

In that case the Court also observed:
"It seems inescapable, also, to conclude
that Rule60(b) (1) is applicable herein
the letter and spirit of rules governing
procedure and prac.tice and the the doctrine of exercise of dili~ence in the
presentation of one's rig ts, failing
which they are amenable to a limitations statutor feature lookin to repose o
iti~ation
a ter a reasona e
time
inter icted here to be three
months under Rule 60(b)(l).
(Emphasis
added).
See also Parks v. Parks, 574 P.2d 588, 91 N.M. 369.
8.
URCP,

After the three month limit imposed by Rule 60(0),
had expired

relief could not be obtained

without a

separate action.
In Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704, the Court reaffirmed its
positon in
effect

P;lcher,
~S~h~a~w:........:v~·:........:~~::..::..=-.:..:;..;._

that after

9 U.2d 222, 341 P.2d 949, to the

the three month period had expired any
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....

other attempts to vacate a judgment must be by an independent action,

not by a

further motion as was attempted in

this case.

9.

Defendants'

60(b),

URCP,

motion

filed

Mr

by

Sessions was properly denied since Judges Snow, Conder and
Taylor had all ruled on similar motions:
Defendants' motion by Mr. Sessions (after Mr.
had

withdrawn),

denial

of

which

is

the

subject

Edmonds
of

this

appeal, was filed in violation of 78-7-19, UCA, 1953, which
provides in part as follows:
"REPEATED APPLICATION FOR ORDERS FORBIDDEN. If an application for an order,
made to a judge or a court in which the
action or proceeding is pending,
is
refused in whole or in part, or is
granted
conditionally,
no
subsequent
applicant for the same order can be made
to any other judge, except of a higher
court; • • • "
The conditional order of Judge Snow (R. 272 - Appendix "C"),
the orders of Judge Conder (R. 356, 361, and 372 - Appendix
"E")

and Judge Taylor

(R.

393

-

Appendix "G")

constitute

prior orders within the meaning of that statute which precluded

defendants

60 (b),

URCP,

for

from
relief

rights were limited
they were

to

dissatisfied

subsequent orders.

again
from

filing
said

appealing
with

the

a

motion under

judgement.
to

Rule

Defendants

the Supreme Court if

judgment,

or

any of the

No appeal was taken on said j udgr:1ent or

orders.
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10.

The judgment and orders of Judge Snow, Conder and

Taylor

were all res judicata

motion

which resulted

when

defendants

filed

the

in the order from which this appeal

is taken:
Under

the

doctrine

of

re:s judicata all matters are

concluded by an order or judgment made when a party has once
attempted to or should have attempted to obtain his relief.
The matter should

then be laid at rest and he should be

denied a second or third attempt to obtain substantially the
same objective under a different guise.
376 P.2d 946,

Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521

Warren Irr. Co. v. Brown, 498 P.2d 667, 28 U.2d

P.2d 379;
103;

14 U.2d 45;

Richards v. Hodson,

485

P.

2d

National Finance Co. of Provo.v. Daley,

URCP, motion.
(R.

1044,
382

26 U.2d 113;
P.2d

405,

14

Defend an ts are limited to a single Rule 60 (b),

U.2d 263.

1976

Weadon v. Pearson,

That motion was filed before Judge Snow in

187),

apparently in

lieu of an appeal.

Later

motions under Rule 60 (b), URCP, violate both 78-7-19, UCA,
1953,

(discussed in paragraph 119 above), and the principal

of res judicata.

Judge Conder's orders (R. 356, 361, 372 -

Appendix "E'') were also res judicata and Judge Taylor was
bound by those orders

since they also were not appealed.

J udge Taylor had no c h oice b ut to h onOr t he prior orders of
Judge Snow, Judge Conder and his own prior order in denying
~r.

Sessions

~otions

. "I")
(R. 418 - Appen d ix
•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

11.

Cases cited by defendants in their brief support

Judge Taylor's

denial of defendants'

60(b), URCP motion:

Counsel for defendants then discusses a few Utah cases
under

which have

special circumstances permitted default

judgments to be vacated after the three month period limited
by Rule 60 (b),

URCP had expired

(P.

14-16) •

Those cases

are readily distinguishable from our fact situation and do
little

to

support

defendants'

appeal

for

the

following

reasons:
(a)
(P.

Ney v. Harrison,

14).

5 U2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956)

That case involved an appeal from a 60 (b), URCP,

order of the District Court vacating a 11 month old default
judgment against a wife who believed that she was protected
from

liability

ordered her

as

the

ex-husband

result

of

to

the

involved in that lawsuit.

pay

a

divorce
real

decree which

estate commission

In that case the Court discussed

with approval the rule established in Warren v. Dixon Ranch
Co., 260 P.2d 741,

123 U. 416, to the effect that

". • • this court on appeal wil 1 reverse
the trial court only where an abuse of
discretion is clearly shown."
The Supreme Court went on in that decision to
state:
"
• it is largely
cretion of the trial
default
should
be
discretion will not be
there is a patent abuse
-24-

within the discourt whether a
relieved,
which
disturbed unless
thereof."
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In our case, unlike the fact situation in Ney v. Harrison,
supra, and in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. , Supra, the District
Court

has

exercised

its discretion by denying relief.

A

brief review of Judge Snow's Findings of Fact #9 thru 28 (R.
176

Appendix

"A"),

and

of the discussion herein under

"Statenent of Facts" pages 2 thru 15 above shows that Judge
Taylor did

not

abuse his discretion and was justified in

his

of

those motions.

denial

"clearly"

show

Taylor.

It

a

is

"patent
also

Defendants have failed

abuse"

important

supra,

and

supra,

simple

default

failure

case

were

to

answer,

whereas

of discretion by Judge

to keep in mind

Ney v. Harrison,

to

that the

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co,
judgment

situations

for

the judgment in this case was

entered after hearing at which defendants were represented
by counsel, and the order of December, 1976, (R. 272 - Appendix "C")
ment

imposing conditions for vacating of that judg-

(which conditions were never met by defendants)

was

entered with the approval of defendants' attorney Mr. Bottum
who consented to an order striking a conflicting order that
had

been presented

to

the Court by Mr.

Bottum

(R.

271-

2 73).
(b)

Stewart v. Sullivan,

74 (1973) - (P. 15):

29 U.2d. 156, 506 P.2d

In that case the Court and all counsel

were under the impression that an order dismissing a case
for

failure

to answer interrogatories had been a dismissal
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without prejudice, whereas it was in fact a dismissal with
prejudice, a fact which was not learned by the client until
new counsel was employed after his former attorney had peen
The Court held

suspended.
abused

that

the

its discretion by correcting

lower

court

had not

the order under Rule

69(b) (7), URCP, more than a year after the judgment had been
The Court could well

entered.

have made that correction

under Rule 60 (a), URCP, which privided that clerical errors
In that case similar inter-

can be corrected at any time.

rogatories had been answered in a companion case which had
thereafter been consolidated
fact available
ffirmed

the

in

the

lower

so

file.

that

The

Court and

found

the

Supreme Court
that

Applying

cretion had not been abused.

answers were in

the

again a-

Court's dis-

that

rule

to the

facts in our case shows that this Court should affirm the
denial by Judge Taylor of the motion to vacate the judgment
and order.
(c)

Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir.

1964) and King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D.C.R.I. 1969)
(P. 16-17 of defendants' brief:
Theses cases deal with situations where a where a
"diligent" client was relieved of a dismissal (Steuart v.
Matthew,
supra)
who

had

supra)

and

of

a

judgment

(King v.

Mordowan~,

because of "inexcusable neglect" by their attorney
personal

problems.

Those

cases

are

interesting
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but do little to assist defendants under our fact situation.
There is nothing in the record to show that defendants were
"diligent".
to

Among other things defendants failed to submit

a deposition

interrogatories

noticed by plaintiff
and

to

produce

repeated demands and motions.

(R. 57), to answer

documents

notwithstanding

Those defaults continued even

after judgment had been entered on two prior occaisions for
failure to respond to discovery (R.
the

judgment was

116 and 141) and after

finally entered by Judge Snow and would

have

been

set

aside per Judge Snow's order of December,

1976,

(R.

272

-

plied

with

discovery.
Olsen was

the

Appendix "C")
terms

of

had defendants simply com-

that

order

by participating

in

While affidavits were filed asserting that Mr.
ill (See discussion P.

5 and 6 above) no affi-

davits or other explanation were given to excuse failure of
Mrs.

Sine

personally

to

respond

signed

to discovery.

answers

to

Both Olsen and Sine

interrogatories

in January,

1977, which by their terms showed that they had been outstanding since 1972

(R.

292) and answer to interrogatories

which had been outstanding since 1975, (R. 301-313) •
discovery

(R.

363,

375)

established

that

Later

their answer

to

interrogatory #10 was false.

Under Rule 37(a)(e), URCP, an

incomplete

as

answer

is

treated

failure

to answer.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

Both

defendants wholly failed

to

requests

subr;iitted

375).

for

in

May,

1978,

The defendants willfully and deliberately

refused

to

orders.

participate

in

discovery

and

to

(R.

fai~ed

obey

363
and

court

See discussion under "Stater;ient of Facts" above.

12.
by

admissions

answer the interrogtories and

Discretion exercised by Judge Taylor is supported

the record of defendants' willful failure to comply with

discovery,

court

orders, and aggravated

circumstances and

was not an abuse of discretion:
In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Numley, 17 U.2d 97, 396 P. 2d
410,

the

Supremem

Court

affirmed

a

j udgrnent

awarded for

failure to comply with a pretrial discovery order requireing
production of documents,
case,

holding

discretion.

that

a

situtation very similar to our

the district

court

had not abused its

In that decision the Court stated several rules

which are applicable to our fact situaton and appear to be
dispositive of defendants' appeal, as follows:
"Whether the failure to complt with the
court's
order has been wi ltul and
whether the circumstances are so aggravated as to justify the action taken is
rimaril for the trial court to determine.
Ci ting Ras ury v. Bainun,
U.
2d
239)
Unless it is shown that his
action is without support in the record,
or is a plain abuse of discretion,
it
should not be disturbed.
There
is
nothing to suggest that such was the
situation here.
But on the contrary,
there are several consideratons which
support the trial court's action.
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We
first
note the basic premise on
appeal:
That the judgment is presumed
to be correct and that the burden of establishing its invalidity is upon the
party attacking it."
(Emphasis added)
Judge Snow's judgment was supported by detailed findings of
fact

concerning

the

refusal

of

defendants

to obey court

orders and to participate in discovery (R. 175, ,9-28 - Appendix "A").

The other orders are all founded upon just

cause as discussed above.

The order of Judge Taylor from

which the appeal is taken (R. 418 - Appendix "I") is justified

in view of the record in this case, was not an abuse

of discretion and should not be disturbed by this court.
Rasbury v. Bainum,

15 U.2d 62,

387 P.2d 239,

In

the Supreme

Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure

to

In Rio Grande Gas Co.

produce records as ordered.

v. Gilvert

491

P.2d

162,

the

New

Mexico

Supreme

Court

affirmed dismissal of a case for failure to produce documents within the times required by the Court's order, finding

that

efforts

by

the

defendants

were not

efforts to comply with the Court's order.

good

faith

That Court dis-

cusses approval at Page 164 this Court's holding in
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Numley 16 U.2d 97, 306 P.2d 410, 412,
and also reaffirmed the Utah Court's opinion that the decision
of the trial court would not be disturbed unless it is
· h out support in t h e recor d , or
wit

wa s

a

plain

abuse
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of

13.

United States Supreme Court has held that issue on

appeal is not whether the appellant court would have granted
as an original matter,

but whether

lower court

abused its

discretion:
In

National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,

Inc., 1976, 96 S. Ct., 2778, 2780, 427 U.S. 637, 649-643, 49
L. Ed2d 474, the trial court had ordered disnissal for what
it found to be flagrant bad faith on the part of plaintiff
in failing to answer interrogatories.

The court of appeals

felt that the sanction was too severe, particularly since it
believed

that

plaintiff

would

comply

rules in the future, and it reversed.
turn,

reversed

the

court

of

the

discovery

The Supreme Court, in

appeals

district court's order of dismissal.

with

and

reinstated

the

In doing so the Supreme

Court stated:
"The question, of course, is not whether
the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the action;
it is whether the District Court abused
its discretion in so doing"
The reversal by the Supreme Court came because the Supreme
Court found that the Court of appeals was in error in finding an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The Court in

that case also observed:
"But here, as in other areas of the
law, the mot servere in the spectrum of
sanctions must be available
to
the
district court in appropriate cases, not
merely to penalize those whose conduct
may be deened to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be
tempted to such conduct in the absence
of such a deterrent."
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In Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co., C.A. 10th, 1978, 570 F.2d
1370, the Court of Appeals held that ultimate and reluctant
production of documents over more than a year after legitimate requests would not absolve plaintiff of a charge that
it willfully failed to obey a valid court order.

See also

Denton v. Mr. Swiss of Missouri, CA 8th, 1977, 564 F.2d 236;
General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb MFG.
481

F.2d

Co.,

C.A. 8th, 1973,

G.K. Property & Revevelopment Agencey of

1204;

City of San Jose,

C.A.

9th, 1978, 577 F.2d 645;

Plant v.

Chrysler Cor., D.C. Del. 1975, 70 F.R.D. 35.
14.

Defendants are charged with acts of their attorney

where they elected

to continue

to use his services

after

had obtained relief from Judge Snow based upon alleged mis
conduct of that attorney:
Mr. Bottum appeared for defendants in 1976 (R. 215) and
successfully argued to Judge Snow that defendants should not
be penalized for the misconduct and neglect of Mr. Edmonds

(R.

269).

services

When defendants elected to continue with the

of Mr.

employ Mr.

Edmonds after they had been required to

Bottom to

try to salvage them from the prior

neglect of Mr. Edmonds, they cannot two years later again be
heard to make the same excuse (defendants brief P. 17-25) •
They selected their attorney and a rebound by his acts and
omissions.

tlotice to an attorney is notice to his client

Alexander v. Russo,

571

P2d

229,

see

also Wests Pacific

Digest Key # 104 and cases then cited.
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Counsel for defendants then discusses in generalitites
(P. 17-23) the various motions, orders and proceedings which
occurred in an unsuccessful effort to compel defendants to
answer the two sets of interrogatories submitted/ by plaintiff (R.
plaintiff

44,90),
for

apparently in an effort to somehow blme

defendants'

refusal

to

permit

discovery,

refusal to obey court orders, and for the many appearances
made by plaintiff's

attorney in

an

effort to obtain dis-

covery.
15.

Defendants cannot now object to interrogatories on

appeal when they failed to answer,

object or move

for pro-

tective order.
Counsel for defendant criticizes the many indulgences
granted to counsel for defendants by repeated continuances
(P.

18-19), refraining from imposing more severe sanctions

at an earlier date and for refraining from entering judgment
after it had been ordered by the Court (R. 116).
for defendants

also

criticizes

the

content of

the

Counsel
inter-

rogatories submitted by plaintiffs, asserting that they were
designed to harass instead of to discover (P.

19), however

no objections were filed within the time provided by Rule

33 (a), URCP, and no motion for a protective order was filed
objections to discovery only after the motion for j udgrnent
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as

provided

by

Rule

26(c),

URCP.

Defendants

filed

ob-

jections to discovery only after the motion for judgment had
been

argued

(R.

171)

judgment (R. 174).

but before Judge Snow had granted

Rule 33(a), URCP, requires that answers

to be filed within the time required as to all interrogatories to which no objection is filed.

Defendants elected

to not object or answer and made no objection to the content
of the interrogatories in opposition to the various motions
to compel and resulting orders compelling (discussed above).
If the defendants had a genuine problem concerning the scope
of a particular question the matter should have been discussed
with counsel, for plaintiff, and if it could not be resolved
between counsel, then should have then brought the matter
before the Court on an objection or motion for protective
order.

Defendants are too late to now object to the content

of interrogatories submitted in 1972 and 1975, in an effort
to vacate a 1976 judgment.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to
vacate a two year old judgment and to vacate a later order
concerning

that

orders

the

of

judgment
same

and

(which
two

order

construed

other judges)

earlier

should not be

disturbed on appeal since the manner in which the discretion
was exercised is supported by the record and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
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In support of his
findings

of fact

participate
orders

in

concerning

discovery

compelling

if

the

the

and

discovery

Judge Snow ordered
vacated

judgment Judge

that

the

Snow made detailed

refusal

their

of defendants to

disobedience of court

(Appendix

"A",

judgment might

record were made

to

~[9 ,' thru

28).

thereafter be

show compliance with

conditions which he imposed (including compliance with prior
orders compelling discovery - Appendix "C")

Judge

Conder

gave the defendant a further chance to comply with discovery
(Appendix
failed

E") •

Judge

Taylor

found

that

defendants had

to comply with the conditions imposed by Judge Snow

and Judge Conder,

that the original judgment of Judge Snow

had not been vacated and ordered that execution issue (Ap·
pendix "G") •
"H")

New counsel's 60 (b),

to vacate

the

two

year

old

URCP, motion (Appendix
judgment to Judge Snow

(Appendix "B") the order of Judge Taylor (Appendix "G") was
denied by Judge Taylor (Appendix "I")
with respect

to

the order

Those motions (except

of Judge Taylor,

Appendix "I")

were all filed more than 3 months after the order or jud~
ment.
Defendants' efforts to confuse the issues by assertions
that Judge Taylor was

confused,

that interrogatories sub·

mitted were burdensome, that the orders compelling discovery
were confusing,

that their attorney was grossly negligent,

and that they should be permitted relief after expiration of
the 3 month limit imposed by Rule 60(b), URCP, are without
merit.
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Defendant's

claim

that

they

should

be

relieved

of

responsibility for

the alleged omissions of their attorney

are without merit,

particulary since they elected to con-

tinue

his

services

after

judgment

had

been

entered

and

conditionally vacated by reason of those alleged omissions.
If the rules are to be enforced are to be unclogged,
and cases are to be moves along in a reasonable manner, it
is essential that the Court have available the most severe
of sanctions to determine similar conduct by others.
The

order

of Judge Taylor denying defendants'

60 (b),

URCP, motion to vacate judgment and orders should be denied,
particularly since similar motions had been made and ruled
upon by

the

same

and

other judges,

those orders had not

been appealed and were res judicata.
Dated

the~-

day of July, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

a:i~~&-e~
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 486-9636
Attorney for plaintiff respondent

I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing
to be hand-delivered the /3 day of July, 1979 • to B~y~~
E. Roe, attorney for appella&ts 340 East Fourth h o u t- : z a
Lake City, Utah 84111.
fl /()
.

/,j_)
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~~'--

'

J-

Ron~ld C. Barker

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-35-

~

